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ABSTRACT 
 
The FDA maintains almost complete control over the approval, labeling, and marketing 
of prescription drugs.  Pharmaceutical companies are generally prohibited from promoting their 
products to doctors for any use other than the ones that have been explicitly approved by the 
FDA.  However, doctors may prescribe drugs that have been approved by the FDA to their 
patients for any purpose for which they believe it will be beneficial. In 1997, Congress passed 
the Food and Drug Modernization Act (FDAMA) which created a limited exception that allows 
drug manufacturers who submit a supplemental new drug application to the FDA for a new use 
of an approved drug to send limited materials directly to doctors.  In enacting the provisions, 
Congress sought to balance the competing interests of patient access to innovative treatments 
with consumer protection and patient safety.   
However, these provisions and the regulations the FDA promulgated under them have 
drawn significant criticism.  Certain critics contend that the restrictions on off-label marketing 
stifle innovation and keep beneficial treatments from patients who need them.  Others argue that 
these exceptions expose patients to significant risk by encouraging them to take drugs that have 
not been proven safe and effective under the FDA standards.  This paper argues that the 
regulatory scheme developed under the FDAMA represents a proper balance between patient 
safety and access to innovative drugs because it seeks to facilitate the education of doctors rather 
than the promotion of drugs.  However, the FDA can go further under the current regulatory 
scheme to find affordable ways to get reliable information to doctors, while still protecting 
patient safety.  By focusing on finding new means to provide doctors with reliable, unbiased 
information the FDA can do just that.   
 - 3 - 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Americans rely heavily on drugs to cure what ails them, improve their mood and health, 
and generally make them feel better.  We can go to our local drug stores to pick up over the 
counter remedies for our headaches or colds.  However, modern medicine also relies heavily on 
the use of prescription drugs that we must get from our doctors.  While doctors have very few 
legislative or regulatory restrictions on their ability to prescribe drugs to patients, the drug 
manufacturers who create, produce, and market the drugs to doctors do.  The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is authorized by Congress to protect the public health by promoting the 
safety and efficacy of prescription drugs sold on the U.S. market.
1  Specifically, the FDA’s 
mission is:  
“(1) To promote and protect the public health by helping safe and effective products 
reach the market in a timely way,  
(2) To monitor products for continued safety after they are in use, and  
(3) To help the public get the accurate, science-based information needed to improve 
health.”
2  
 
To this end, the FDA is authorized to create product standards, regulate the marketing of drugs to 
consumers and physicians, control which drugs enter the US market, and provide information to 
the public.
3  In short, the FDA retains almost complete power over the production, creation, and 
promotion of prescription drugs.  
  The underlying assumption is that the public needs protection from the profit-driven 
pharmaceutical industry that would endanger it by putting under-researched or ineffective drugs 
on the market.  To this end, the FDA prohibits drug manufacturers from marketing their drugs 
“off-label,” or for any use for other than the use it was approved for.  However, while it limits 
                                                 
1 21 U.S.C.A. §393(b)(1) (2008).  
2 FDA Overview: Protecting Consumers Promoting Public Health, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/sld001.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2008).   
3 Id.   - 4 - 
the access of drug manufacturers to public markets, the FDA also seeks to promote public access 
to safe and effective drugs.  And, while the FDA maintains considerable power over the 
pharmaceutical industry, it does not regulate doctors or medical practices.  Doctors then have the 
discretion to prescribe any drug on the market for any uses, those that have been officially 
accepted by the FDA and those that have not.  
In the past two decades, the FDA has begun to permit manufacturers to disseminate 
limited information to physicians about the off-label uses of drugs.  These exceptions to the off-
label marketing prohibition intend to promote pharmaceutical research about new uses of 
approved drugs and get reliable information to physicians about potentially beneficial treatment 
options in a timely manner.  However, these provisions have drawn criticism from all sides.  On 
the one hand, critics argue that they reduce patient safety by exposing more patients to drugs that 
have not been tested for safety and efficiency.  On the other hand, critics argue that these 
provisions do not go far enough to encourage innovation and facilitate getting new treatments to 
the patients who need them.  This paper will examine both sides of the off-label marketing 
debate to analyze whether the current regulatory scheme strikes a proper balance between patient 
safety and access to innovative treatments.   
Section I defines the concept of “off-label marketing.”  Section II then reviews the 
historical development of the FDA’s regulatory authority over drug development, approval, 
labeling, and promotion.  Section III summarizes the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 
and the regulatory framework for off-label marketing under which we operate today.  Section IV 
outlines the popular arguments put forth in the literature.  Section V describes some popular 
suggestions put forth by academics and practitioners about how to improve the system.  And - 5 - 
Section VI suggests a new way to consider the issue and proposes a solution that could both 
promote patient safety and facilitate innovation at the same time.   
I. OFF-LABEL MARKETING DEFINED 
 
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, pharmaceutical manufacturers may not 
promote a drug for any use other than the one for which it obtained FDA approval.
4  Drug labels 
then the use for which the FDA has approved the drug.
5  This paper borrows its definition of off-
label use from William Christopher’s article, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the 
Regulatory Vacuum.
6  Off-Label use of a drug includes “using an approved drug to treat a 
disease that it not indicated on its label, but is closely related to an indicated disease, treating 
unrelated, unindicated diseases, and treating the indicated disease but varying from the indicated 
dosage, regimen, or patient population may all be considered off-label use.”
7 
Off-label marketing then occurs when a drug manufacturer promotes their drug for an 
off-label use.  This paper’s definition of marketing reflects the FDA’s broad definition of 
promotion which includes: “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, 
and newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and 
telephone communication systems.”
8  Promotional materials also include any communication or 
material which in any way describes the drug issued by or on behalf of the manufacturer, packer, 
or distributor of the drug.
9  While all drugs can be used and marketed off-label (though not 
                                                 
4 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301).  See infra 
Section V.C.1. (outlining the drug approval and labeling requirements).   
5 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2008).  
6 William Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993).   
7 Id.   
8 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1) (2008).   
9 Id. § 202.1(l)(2).   - 6 - 
necessarily legally), this paper discusses only prescription drugs, which patients must get through 
a physicians rather than over the counter drugs which patients can buy directly from a retail 
outlet.   
II.  HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
A. THE FEDERAL FOOD AND DRUGS ACT: A NATIONWIDE SYSTEM FOR REGULATING 
HUMAN DRUGS 
 
The 1906 Food and Drugs Act
10 created a nationwide regulatory system for all human 
drugs.
11  The 1906 Act prohibited the distribution in interstate commerce of any food and drugs 
that were adulterated or misbranded.  Congress gave the FDA the power to take misbranded 
drugs off the market through a court order.
12  It also provided criminal sanctions for introducing 
misbranded drugs into the marketplace.
13  However, under the Act, the FDA had no pre-market 
authority to seize drugs or to demand proof that the drug was safe or effective.
14  
Under the statute a drug was “misbranded” if it made “false or misleading statements 
regarding a food or drug on the package or label thereof.”
15  The 1906 Act also prohibited the 
sale of imitation drugs or fakes.  The only labeling requirements for drugs under the statute were 
that any ingredients listed on the packaging must be factually true, drug imitations had to be 
                                                 
10 Food & Drugs Act, Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1907). 
11 Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1754, 1758 (1996).  Congress had regulated biological drugs four years earlier in the 
Biologics Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 728.  The law was passed as a response to the selling of a 
diphtheria vaccine that was infected with tetanus and which had killed several children in 1901. 
PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 8-
9 (2d ed. 1991).  That act required pre-market approval for biological products such as vaccines 
for safety and efficacy. See id.; Merrill, supra, at 1758.   
12 Food & Drugs Act, §10, 34. Stat. at 771. 
13 Id. § 2 at 768.   
14 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1758.   
15 Lauffer Hayes & Frank Ruff, The Administration of the Federal Food and Drugs Act, 1 L. & 
CONTEM. PROBLEMS 16 (1933), reprinted in HUFF & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 9.   - 7 - 
clearly labeled as such, and drug labels had to state the quantity of any narcotics which were 
present in the drug.
16 
The 1906 Act’s definition of misbranding did not prohibit false efficiency or therapeutic 
claims, although the FDA tried to argue that it did in United States v. Johnson.
17 In that case, the 
government indicted a drug manufacturer for misbranding under the Act for shipping drugs 
between states which it falsely claimed cured cancer.   The Supreme Court held that the statute 
did not prohibit all false claims, but rather only prohibited false claims that “determine the 
identity of the article.”
18  Congress responded to the court’s holding in Johnson by amending the 
1906 Act so that the definition of misbranded included any statement on the labeling which was 
false or fraudulent.
19  However, the fraudulence requirement of the Act meant that the 
government had to prove that the seller knew that the statements on the packaging were false.
20    
Because it was unable to prevent the drug from entering the market place in the first place 
and was only able to remove the drug if it could prove that the seller intended to commit fraud, 
the FDA’s ability to prevent misbranded drugs from being sold was extremely limited under the 
1906 Act.
21  It remained so for several decades until a tragedy in 1937 spurned Congress into 
action.   
                                                 
16 Food & Drugs Act, §8, 34 Stat. at 770-71.  See also id. at 10.   
17 221 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1911).   
18 Id. at 497; see Merrill, supra note 11, at 1759. 
19 Ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416, §8 at 417 (1912).  See also Merrill, supra note 11, at 1759; Katherine A. 
Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A Century of FDA 
Regulation from Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Promotion, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 117, 125 (Autumn 2007).   
20 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1759. 
21 Id.  See also Helm, supra note 19, at 125-26. - 8 - 
During September and October of 1937, a drug, Elixir Sulfanilamide, killed more than 
100 people, many of them children, in over 15 states.
22  Sulfanilamide had been sold in tablet and 
powder form to cure streptococcal infections.
23  However, in 1937, the company that 
manufactured it produced a liquid version of the drug, which included diethylene glycol, a highly 
poisonous ingredient normally used as antifreeze.  The company tested for flavor, appearance, 
and fragrance, but not for safety, and then sent the elixir all over the country.
24  By the time the 
FDA was notified of the deaths and initiated the first nationwide recall of a drug, 633 shipments 
of the elixir had been sent all around the country and 105 people had been killed.
25  This incident 
would likely have been prevented had the FDA had the authority to require pre-market safety 
testing.  Congress created a system for pre-market FDA notification of drugs in the 1938 Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
26  This system became the beginning of our current system of pre-
market approval.
27   
B. FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: PRE-MARKET NOTIFICATION 
 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) required drug manufacturers 
to test drugs for safety and provide the results of the tests to the FDA before introducing the 
drugs to the market.
28  The most significant innovation of the FDCA was the creation of the 
                                                 
22 Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: the 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, 
FDA CONSUMER MAG., June 1981, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/elixir.html.   
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, Ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
301-99 (2007)) [hereinafter FDCA]. 
27 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1762.   
28 FDCA § 505(a)-(c), 52 Stat. at 1052 (1938).  Merrill, supra note 11, at 1761-62; Helm, supra 
note 19, at 127.   - 9 - 
“new drug” category of drugs.
29  The FDCA defined a “new drug” as: “any drug the composition 
of which is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and 
experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions prescribed, 
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”
30  Before a drug manufacturer could market 
a new drug, it had to submit an effective New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA.   The New 
Drug Application had to provide the results of safety trials, detail the chemical makeup of the 
drug, and describe how the drug would be manufactured.
31  A NDA automatically became 
effective 60 days after it was submitted to the FDA unless the FDA either disapproved it or 
notified the applicant that it was extending its review to 180 days.
32   
The FDCA also gave the FDA the authority to control many aspects of drug labeling. 
Under the new statute, a drug was mislabeled if its labeling was “false or misleading in any 
particular.”
33 Thus, the government no longer had to prove that the seller committed intentional 
fraud to remove a drug from the market for false labeling.  Moreover, the FDCA required that 
the drug be labeled with considerable safety and dosage warnings and “adequate directions for 
use.”
34  And, drug manufacturers had to get approval from the FDA if they sought to change 
their product’s labeling.
35   
While the FDCA significantly expanded the power of the FDA to regulate the pre-market 
approval of drugs, this power was still considerably limited.  First, under the FDCA, the FDA 
                                                 
29 FDCA § 201(p), 52 Stat. at 1041-42 (1938).  Merrill, supra note 11, at 1761; Note, Drug 
Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEORGETOWN L.J. 185 (1971), reprinted in HUTT 
& MERRILL, supra note 11, at 476.   
30 FDCA § 201(p)(1), 52 Stat. at 1041-42 (1938).   
31 Id. § 505(b), 52 Stat. at 1052.   
32 Id. § 505(c), 52 Stat. at 1052.   
33 Id. § 502(a), 52 Stat. at 1050. 
34 Id. § 502(f)(1)-(2), 52 Stat. at 1051. 
35 Id. § 502(g), 52 Stat. at 1051. - 10 - 
was only permitted to evaluate the safety of drugs before they could be marketed to the public; it 
did not give the FDA the power to evaluate the efficacy of new drugs.
36  Second, the Act did not 
extend to the FDA the power to evaluate the safety of all drugs before they went to market.  The 
FDCA only applied to drugs that were not already on the market.
37  The FDCA left the drug 
manufacturers with the discretion to decide if the drug they were introducing to the market was 
generally recognized as safe, and therefore, not “new.”  “Consequently, a manufacturer could 
introduce a drug whose safety FDA had no opportunity to review.”
38   
The 1938 Act also left to drug manufacturers the ability to categorize their drug as 
prescription or non-prescription.
39  However, in 1951, Congress passed the Durham-Humphrey 
Amendment which, for the first time distinguished between those drugs that could be marketed 
and sold directly to consumers and those that had to be dispensed only through licensed 
physicians.
40  Those drugs that could not be labeled with directions sufficient to make them safe 
for unsupervised use or those that were too toxic for unsupervised use were deemed prescription 
drugs.  Those that did not present these risks and challenges were deemed non-prescription, or 
over-the-counter (“OTC”), drugs.
41  The FDCA and Durham-Humphrey Amendment 
“architected the FDA’s role as guardian of public safety in the drug industry.”
42  However, 
                                                 
36 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1762; Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 
supra note 29, at 477.   
37 FDCA § 210(p)(1), 52 Stat. at 1042 (1938).  
38 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1762.  See JERRY MASHAW & RICHARD A. MERRILL, THE AMERICAN 
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463, 498 (1st ed. 1975); HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 478.   
39 Helm, supra note 19, at 127.    
40 Durham-Humphrey Amendment, ch. 578, 65 Stat. 648 (1951) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 353) (2008).   
41 Id. 65 Stat. at 648-49 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A)) (2008).   
42 Helm, supra note 19, at 128.   - 11 - 
without being able to assess the medical benefits of a drug, staff at the FDA understood that they 
could never truly evaluate whether a drug was safe.
43 
C.  THE 1962 DRUG EFFICACY AMENDMENTS: EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY 
 
Congress finally gave the FDA the power to evaluate the efficacy of new drugs in the 
1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, which prohibited the shipment of any new drug in interstate 
commerce without FDA approval of its safety and efficacy.
44 In addition to creating an efficacy 
requirement, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments made two other significant changes to the drug 
review process. 
45    First, they transformed the FDCA’s pre-market notification system, in which 
drug manufacturers could automatically proceed to market with a new drug if the FDA had not 
objected within 60 days, to a pre-market approval system in which they had to wait for explicit 
approval from the FDA to bring a new drug to market.
46  Second, they expanded the FDA’s 
authority to oversee the design and implementation of the clinical trials that drug manufacturers 
employed to test the safety and efficacy of new drugs.
47 With the passage of the Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments, also knows as the Drug Efficacy Amendments, Congress created the basic drug 
regulatory structure under which we operate today.
48 
                                                 
43 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1764.   
44 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331-32, 348, 351-53, 357-60, 372, 374, 376, 381 (1970)) [hereinafter 
Kefauver-Harris Amendments].  See also Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 
supra note 29, at 477; HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 477.   
45 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1764.   
46 Id. at 1765; See also Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, supra note 29, at 
477. 
47 Id. at 1765-66; Helm, supra note 19, at 130.   
48 See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1764; Helm, supra note 19, at 129. - 12 - 
The efficacy requirement was added under the definition of new drugs, which Congress 
expanded to cover any drug that is not generally recognized as safe and effective.
49  The testing 
and reporting requirements for New Drug Applications were dramatically expanded as a result of 
the new efficacy requirement.  In addition to showing that a new drug was safe, the drug 
manufacturer had to provide data demonstrating that the drug was effective for the therapeutic 
use for which it was being marketed.
50  Under the old system, once a drug manufacturer had 
shown that a drug was safe, it could have conceivably marketed it to the public for any number 
of therapeutic uses.  However, the new definition of “new drug” in the Drug Efficacy 
Amendments meant that each use of a drug could require additional testing and FDA review.
51  
Unlike the 1938 Amendments, which exempted drugs already on the market from having to 
provide data on safety, the 1962 Amendments required the FDA to review all of the drugs that 
had been the subject of effective NDAs since the FDCA went into effect.
52  
The Amendments required the FDA affirmatively to approve drugs for safety and 
efficiency before they could be marketed.
53  As Richard Merrill points out, “the law thus gave 
the FDA an effective veto over the marketing of any drug over about which it had 
reservations.”
54 Further, the Drug Efficacy Amendments extended the time that the FDA had to 
review the NDA from 60 days to 180 days.
55  If the FDA failed to make a decision in that time 
                                                 
49 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, § 102(a)(2), 76 Stat. at 781. 
50 Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, supra note 29, at 477; Merrill, supra 
note 11, at 1765-66; Helm, supra note 19, at 129; HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 513. 
51 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1765-66.   
52 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 478. The FDA had some trouble meeting this requirement 
it marked a large expansion of the FDA's power to regulate drugs on the market.  For a full 
discussion of the FDA’s efforts to evaluate the NDAs of drugs on the market for efficiency, see 
id. at 478-84.  
53 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, § 505(c)(1), 76 Stat. at 781. 
54 Merrill, supra note 11, at 1765.   
55 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, § 505(c), 76 Stat. at 781. - 13 - 
period, then the manufacturer could request a decision.  However, few applicants ever pushed for 
a decision and only three times have rejected applicants challenged the FDA’s decision in 
court.
56  Thus, the 1962 Amendments put drug manufacturers at the mercy of the FDA’s 
efficiency, capacity, and priority to get their drugs to market.   
Finally, the Drug Efficacy Amendments gave the FDA considerable authority over the 
design and implementation of the clinical trials that drug manufacturers used to test whether their 
products were safe and effective.
57  In addition to requiring that the FDA refuse approval for any 
drug about which it had lingering safety concerns, Section 505(d) was amended to require the 
FDA to reject any New Drug Application for which there was “a lack of substantial evidence that 
the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use 
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.”
58  Moreover, under the 
new Section 505(e) under the Amendment, the FDA had to withdraw approval for any drug if it 
found “on the basis of new information before him with respect to such drug, evaluated together 
with the evidence available to [it] when the application was approved, that there is a lack of 
substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have under 
the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”
59
   The Act 
defined “substantial evidence” as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled 
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and 
                                                 
56 HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 532; Merrill, supra note 11, at 1766 n. 42.  Applicants 
likely have not been inclined to push the FDA to move more quickly since to do so would be to 
agitate the entity controlling whether or not their product makes it to market.   
57 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, § 505(d), 76 Stat. at 781.  See also HUTT & MERRILL, supra 
note 11, at 480; Merrill, supra note 11, at 1766; Note, Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug 
Amendments, supra note 29, at 477.   
58 Kefauver-Harris Amendments, § 505(d)(5), 76 Stat. at 781 
59 Id. § 505(e)(3), 76 Stat. at 782.   - 14 - 
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”
60  Because it was up to the FDA 
to determine what constituted substantial evidence, it had considerable control in shaping what 
kinds of clinical trials drug manufacturers could use to prove that their drugs did what they 
claimed to do.   
Furthermore, before drug manufacturers could begin clinical trials on human beings, 
under the 1962 Amendments, they were required to submit an Investigational New Drug 
Application (INDA) to get FDA authorization to proceed with human clinical trials.
61  The 
INDA had to include reports of preclinical testing “adequate to justify clinical testing”
62 and had 
to detail the proposed clinical testing plan.
63   The Amendments thus gave to the FDA control 
over the preclinical research and the clinical trials that drug manufacturers employed to get a 
drug to the marketplace.  “At the end of the day, drug makers must persuade FDA reviewers that 
they have submitted enough evidence to prove that a drug works.  As a result, the agency has 
become the most influential source of guidance on the design of clinical drug studies in the 
country . . . .”
64
 
1.  New Drug Application Process Under the Drug Efficacy Amendments  
The 1962 Amendments granted to the FDA plenary control over the design, production, 
distribution, and marketing of new drugs to the marketplace.  In order to exercise this new 
authority, the FDA set in place a series of regulations and guidelines outlining the requirements 
for approval of a New Drug Application.
65  The two aspects of the New Drug Approval 
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application which were most significant to off-label marketing are the efficacy and labeling 
requirements.
66   
a. Efficacy Requirements 
“[The efficacy requirement] has . . . provided a solid basis for what the FDA describes as 
a solid regulatory regime in which pharmaceutical products cannot be promoted or suggested for 
any use in the absence of labeling for that approved use by the FDA.”
67  The Drug Efficacy 
Amendments sought to balance the risk of bringing unsafe or therapeutically ineffective drugs to 
market with the cost of delaying safe and effective drugs to market.  The FDA was thus charged 
with developing a system for drug approval that would get safe and effective drugs to market as 
quickly as possible while preventing dangerous or ineffective drugs from being sold to U.S. 
consumers.  To meet this end, the FDA developed a four-step process drug manufacturers must 
follow to get a new drug application approved.   
First, drug manufacturers must conduct preclinical trials testing on animals.  These trials 
must provide the manufacturer with date on the pharmacology and toxicity of the drug.  The 
exact information the manufacturer is required to submit depends on the nature of the drug being 
tested.  However, the pre-clinical investigations must supply the manufacturer with sufficient 
data on the pharmacological activity of the drug, such as how the drug is absorbed, distributed, 
metabolized, and excreted.
68  The investigations must also provide data on the acute toxicology 
                                                                                                                                                            
supra note 11, at 1768-1808.  See generally David L. Stepp, The History of FDA Regulation of 
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(1999). 
67 Thomas A. Hayes, Drug Labeling and Promotion: Evolution and Application of Regulatory 
Policy, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 57, 62 (1996). See also Merrill, supra note 11, at 1765-66; Weeks, 
supra note 66, at 654.     
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of the drug in animals as well as generalized data to support that it is safe to proceed with clinical 
trials on humans.
69  The applicant must submit the data from these preclinical trials in the INDA, 
as well as a description of the substance of the drug, a copy of the labeling that will be sent to the 
drug investigators, information on the laboratory practices of the applicant, and any information 
on previous human experience with the drug.
70  The drug sponsor must also submit a detailed 
protocol plan for how it will conduct the clinical trials.  If the FDA approves and a local 
Institutional Review Board approves the INDA, then the drug sponsor may move ahead to 
clinical trials in humans.
71 
The human trials consist of three phases and require informed consent from the subjects 
of the studies.
72  In Phase I, investigators seek to determine the safety of the drug for use in 
human subjects and generally do not create data on efficacy.
73  Specifically these studies, which 
are typically done on a small number of healthy subjects (between 20 and 80 normally
74), seek to 
determine the toxicity of the drug, how it’s metabolized and excreted, and also look for adverse 
effects.
75  To this end, the investigator will administer the drug at very low dosages in the 
beginning and then increase the dosage very gradually if the drug does not show harmful effects 
at the lower dosages.  If there are significant adverse effects, the drug manufacturer will abandon 
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71 Id. § 312.22(a) (2008).  See also Helm, supra note 19, at 129-30; Weeks, supra note 66, at 
654-55; HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 11, at 515.   
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74 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1) 
75 Id. § 312.21(a)(1)-(2) (2008); THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S PROCESS FOR 
APPROVING NEW DRUGS, supra note 73, at 516; Weeks, supra note 66, at 655; Helm, supra note 
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the trials and the drug at Phase I.
76   
Phase II is the initial stage at which the drug is tested on people who have the condition 
or disease the drug is designed to treat to gather initial data on efficacy, dosage at which the drug 
is effective, side effects, and risks.
77  Phase II also involves a small number of subjects, usually 
no more than a few hundred.
78  As in Phase I, the protocols will usually begin by giving subjects 
low dosages and then increasing the dosages as the trials continue.
79  If the drug does not prove 
to be effective at this phase, then it will be abandoned.  If the drug is safe and effective in these 
small trials, then the study will proceed to large-scale clinical trials in Phase III.
80   
Phase III trials are to evaluate the benefits and risks of the drug as a whole as well as to 
“provide a basis”
 81 for labeling.
82  They are usually double-blind experiments in which a control 
group receives a placebo and can involve thousands of patients.
83  Investigators in Phase III trials 
will pay particular attention to side effects, adverse reactions, and negative interactions with 
other medications.
84  If the drug manufacturer can complete two Phase III trials which 
demonstrate efficacy without significant adverse reactions and which are scientifically sound, the 
data for these two studies will then be submitted for approval to the FDA as part of the New 
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Drug Application.
85  Only one of ten drugs for which a sponsor obtained an IND, will have 
enough promising data to submit an NDA.
86 
The FDA requires drug manufacturers to present new and substantial evidence to support 
every therapeutic indication for a particular drug.
87  This rule applies to pre-market drugs and 
drugs for which a manufacturer has already gotten approval for one use.  When a manufacturer 
wishes to market a drug for a use other than the one for which it has FDA approval, it must file a 
Supplemental New Drug Application (SNDA) to gain approval for the new use.
88  In addition to 
a new therapeutic use for a drug, manufacturers must file a SNDA for any new aspects of a drug 
which require a change to the drug’s labeling, including change in dosages, strength of the drug, 
changes in ingredients or design of the drug, change in populations the drug is used to treat, or 
manufacturing changes.
89 The SNDA must contain new data from new clinical trials that 
demonstrate the drug’s effectiveness for the unapproved use.
90  Under the FDA Guidelines, 
manufacturers are generally permitted to submit the preclinical data and the data from the 
original Phase I clinical trials in support of the new use application.
91  However, the sponsor of 
the application must conduct new Phase II and Phase III studies to show that the drug is effective 
for the new indication.
92  
Phase III clinical trials are the most expensive and time consuming part of the drug 
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approval process.
93  And, once a drug is approved for one use, drug manufacturers “face strong 
disincentives against seeking permission to market off-label uses of their products.”
94  This 
pressure is further exacerbated by the fact that once the original drug is approved for the new 
use, patents barring generic drug imitations of the original drug might have expired and the 
generic drug will also be approved for the new use; thus reducing the manufacturers projected 
revenue from the new use.
95 
Though drug manufacturers are prohibited from marketing a drug for uses for which they 
are not approved, physicians are permitted to prescribe drugs for uses other than their approved 
indications.
96   
“If an approved new drug is shipped in interstate commerce with the approved package 
insert, and neither the shipper nor the recipient intends that it be used for an unapproved 
purpose, the requirements of Section 505 of the Act are satisfied.  Once the new drug is 
in a local pharmacy, . . . , the physician may, as part of the practice of medicine lawfully 
prescribe a different dosage for his patient or may otherwise vary the conditions of use 
from those approved in the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of 
the FDA.”
97 
 
While “off-label” uses of prescription drugs are commonplace in medical practice, any 
promotion by manufacturers of indications that the FDA has not approved are a violation of the 
FDCA.
98  The FDA defines promotion broadly, “stated simply, its view is that any material 
describing uses of the drug that is distributed by or at the direction of the manufacturer – 
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regardless of whether the material was authored by the manufacturer—constitutes “promotion.”
99  
This paper will discuss the FDA regulations on off-label promotion in greater detail in Section 
III.  
b. Labeling Requirements 
Section 201 of the FDCA defines labeling as: “all labels and other written, printed, or 
graphic matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying 
such article.”
100  The FDA advocated a broad definition of labeling in Kordel v. United States
101 
in 1948.  In that case, the Supreme Court agreed with the FDA that “accompanying such article” 
included materials that were not physically attached to the drug or even shipped with the drug.  
Rather, than the physical proximity, the court said,  “it is the textual relationship that is 
significant.”
102  If the materials contain information about the drug that is descriptive or 
instructive, then they count as labeling.  A drug label for a prescription drug “must provide ‘full 
disclosure,’ which means adequate information concerning its safety and effectiveness for its 
intended use by the practitioner who dispenses it. Each prescription drug package must include 
information that fully discloses any warnings and provides adequate directions for proper 
use.”
103   
The 1938 FDCA gave the FDA the power to regulate the labeling of prescription 
drugs.
104  However, the FDA enforced labeling requirements primarily through the misbranding 
provisions of the FDCA.
105  It did not have the authority to review claims of effectiveness on the 
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drug and could only remove a drug after it had been placed on the market if the labeling was 
“false.”
106  With the passage of the Drug Efficacy Amendments, the FDA was granted the 
authority to control labeling through the new drug approval process.  Now, the drug sponsor 
must submit its proposed labeling with the NDA
107 and the FDA can deny approval if the 
manufacturer fails to submit labeling or it the FDA finds that the labeling proposed is inadequate 
for the drugs intended use.
108  
The FDA first promulgated a regulation defining intended use in 1951, after the Ninth 
Circuit, in Alberty Food Products v. United States
109 held a product misbranded when its labeling 
did not state a therapeutic use that was advertised in a newspaper advertisement. The “intended 
use” of a drug “refers to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of 
drugs.”
110 Intent may be shown in a number of ways including the labeling of the products, 
claims in advertisements, public statements, and the general circumstances surrounding the 
product.
111 The regulations state that:  
“If a manufacturer knows, . . . , that a drug introduced into interstate commerce by him is 
to be used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he 
is required to provide adequate labeling for such a drug which accords with such other 
uses to which the article is to be put.”
112 
 
The drug manufacturer’s responsibility to provide labeling is then very broad, and the regulation 
at least implies that drug manufacturers have a duty to be aware of off-label uses for their 
products and to revise the labeling as necessary to keep up with those uses.
113 
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  Until the Drug Efficacy Amendments, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had 
jurisdiction to oversee the advertising of drugs.
114  However, testimony from physicians that drug 
companies were over selling the benefits of their products while failing to reveal the adverse 
reactions, side effects, and other negative consequences of the drugs in their advertising made it 
clear that the FTC had been ineffectual in controlling prescription drug advertising.
115  As a 
result, Congress gave the FDA jurisdiction over advertising of drugs in 1962 stressing the 
importance of full disclosure.
116 
  Armed with jurisdiction over advertising of prescription drugs, the FDA promulgated 
regulations requiring that drug manufacturers advertise drugs only for the uses and conditions for 
which they have been deemed safe and effective.
117  Drug manufacturers may not make claims in 
advertisements that are not fully supported by substantial evidence for effectiveness. And any 
promotion of drugs for indications other than those for which they have approved labeling 
misbrands the drug.
118 Thus, any claim made in an advertisement or promotion of any kind must 
be “wholly consistent with the approved product labeling.”
119  
  The FDCA does not define advertisement, however, the FDA regulations on 
advertisements include “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and 
newspapers, and advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone 
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communication systems.”
120  The regulations further proclaim that any communication or 
material which in any way describes the drug issued by or on behalf of the manufacturer, packer, 
or distributor of the drug are subject to the labeling requirements of the FDCA.
121  Thus, under 
the 1962 Act and subsequent regulations, the FDA regulates and controls the dissemination of 
almost all information about drugs on the market.  For many years, the FDA maintained a 
complete ban on the dissemination of information by manufacturers about any uses of drug for 
which there was not approved labeling.  However, these bans were not without challenges from 
manufacturers.   
2.  FDA Guidance on Off-Label Marketing 
  In the late 1980s several reports were published revealing that the pharmaceutical 
industry had been aggressively supporting Continuing Medical Education (CME) Seminars for 
doctors and had been using these seminars as a means to promote off-label as well as off-label 
uses of drugs.
122  Specifically, the reports noted changes in drug prescribing patterns, which they 
concluded, were linked to the increasing pharmaceutical company support of the CMEs.  As a 
result of these reports, Congress conducted hearings to examine the effect of the pharmaceutical 
sponsorship of the CMEs and determined that the seminars were widely being used to promote 
unapproved uses of approved drugs to doctors as well as to tout the drugs for their approved 
uses.
123   
  In response to this information, the FDA looked for a way to continue the industry 
sponsored education seminars, which it realized were invaluable to disseminate information to 
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doctors about approved drug uses, while still restricting drug companies from widespread 
dissemination about off-label uses.  To accomplish this end, the FDA published three Guidance 
Documents to discourage pharmaceutical companies from promoting their products off-label 
through CMEs and other unregulated means such as distributing articles from medical journals 
discussing off-label uses to doctors and other healthcare providers.
124  In the first two Guidance 
Documents, the FDA recognized the legitimacy of dissemination of articles and reference guides 
describing the approved drug uses.  However, the FDA noted that such articles might also 
mention unapproved uses of the drugs.  The Guidance Documents made clear that manufactures 
may not “refer to or otherwise promote information in the article or text that is not consistent 
with the approved labeling for the product.”
125  In the last Guidance Document the FDA directly 
addressed the pharmaceutical supported educational and scientific activities such as the CME 
programs.  The Guidance permitted the educational programs to continue, but attempted to limit 
their content to discussions which were not primarily promotional and were not influenced 
substantively by the pharmaceutical company that supported the program.
126  Further, the 
Guidance Document expanded the definition of “promotional relationship” so that it 
encompassed almost every communication between representatives from the pharmaceutical 
industry and healthcare workers regarding a drug’s effectiveness and use.
127  
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3. First Amendment Challenges to the Restrictions on Off-Label Promotion 
In 1994, the Washington Legal Foundation (“WLF”), a pharmaceutical industry 
supported non-profit organization, brought a First Amendment suit challenging the restrictions 
on the dissemination of information about unapproved uses for approved drugs outlined in the 
three Guidance Documents.
128 Specifically the WLF argued that the exchange of scientific 
information between two independent sources is constitutionally protected and therefore, the 
FDA cannot restrict the exchange of such information simply because it came from 
pharmaceutical companies.
129  They further argued that physicians needed to get reliable 
information about the off-label uses of drugs and the FDA restrictions were infringing on 
doctors’ rights to receive information.
130   
The FDA countered with a two-pronged response. First, it argued that it had a duty to 
protect the quality of the information that doctors received about drugs.  Second, it had a duty to 
provide manufacturers with motivation to get off-label uses approved by filing SNDAs.
131  The 
court sided with the WLF finding that the pharmaceutical companies’ promotional activities 
were constitutionally protected commercial speech.
132  The court then applied the Central 
Hudson test for commercial speech and determined that the Guidance Documents were more 
extensive than necessary to serve the government’s two stated interests and therefore was an 
unconstitutional infringement on commercial speech.  However, the decision was moot by the 
time it was handed down in 1998;
133 in November 1997, President Clinton signed into law the 
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Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997
134 (FDAMA), which, as the judge noted in Friedman, 
“superceded” the FDA Guidance Documents upon becoming effective.
135   
The decision was still a victory for drug manufacturers as it set certain limits on how far 
the FDA can go in regulating the dissemination of information about off-label uses of their 
drugs.
136 Despite the passage of the FDAMA, the district court refused to limit its ruling to the 
Guidance Documents in dispute in Friedman.  And in Washington Legal Fund v. Henney,
137 the 
FDAMA was declared unconstitutional.  However, because the FDA recognized a “safe-harbor” 
for drug manufacturers exercising their constitutional rights in industry-supported scientific and 
educational activities and CME programs, this decision was ultimately vacated and the FDAMA 
was upheld.
138   
III.  THE FOOD AND DRUG MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997 
 
The FDAMA has been described as “the most important change in drug regulation in 20 
years.”
139  It was comprehensive legislation covering a wide variety of provisions that pertained 
to drugs and medical devices including: changes to drug labeling requirements, growing the 
database on clinical trials, and expanding the fast-track approval process for AIDS and cancer 
drugs.
140  Among the many changes, the Act authorized for the first time limited authorization of 
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off-label marketing of drugs.
141  “The provision seeks to balance the interests of physicians, and 
correspondingly of their patients to obtain legitimate information about drug uses, against FDA’s 
continued interest in ensuring that the manufacturers continue to study new drug 
effectiveness.”
142 
 
A.  STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT OFF-
LABEL USES BY DRUG MANUFACTURERS 
 
Under the FDAMA, manufacturers could disseminate authorized written materials 
concerning the new uses for a drug that has already been approved by the FDA to health care 
practitioners, pharmacy benefit managers, health insurance companies, or governmental 
agencies.
143 Authorized written materials were limited to unedited reprints or copies of articles 
appearing in a peer-reviewed scientific or medical journal or in reputable reference texts.
144  
Manufacturers had to “prominently display” a statement with any information that they distribute 
to physicians stating that the information is about a use that has not been approved by the FDA, 
and that it was being disseminated at the manufacturer’s expense.  They also had to disclose the 
financial interests of any authors or consultants.
145  Further, the manufacturers had to include the 
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official labeling for the drug, and information about other drugs that had been approved for the 
use that the information for the unapproved use describes.
146 
Drug manufacturers that wished to disseminate information about off-label use had to 
first submit a copy of the information that they wish to distribute to the FDA 60 days before they 
start to disseminate the materials.
147  In addition, they had to submit any data that relates to the 
safety and effectiveness of the drugs for off-label uses,
148 and they had to submit biannual reports 
listing to whom they distributed the information.
149   Perhaps most importantly, only drug 
manufacturers that had submitted a SNDA for the approval of a labeling change reflecting the 
new use are eligible to send out this information.
150  And they must have either completed the 
efficacy studies supporting the new indication or have submitted a protocol for completing the 
studies within three years after the initial dissemination.
151  Drug manufacturers that have 
completed the new use studies could disseminate information if they submit a certification to the 
FDA that they will submit a SNDA within six months of disseminating the information.
152  The 
statute contains an exception to the required filing of the SNDA if the manufacturer can 
demonstrate that to do so would economically prohibitive or unethical.
153  The FDA could 
demand that the manufacturer stop circulating the information if it determines that the new use is 
not effective, risks the public health, or the manufacture fails to comply with the requirements of 
the Act.
154  
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B. FDA REGULATIONS FOR THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON OFF-LABEL USES 
 
The FDA’s regulations promulgated under the FDAMA tried to balance the statute’s dual 
goals of promoting education and the dissemination of reliable information about new uses of 
drugs while protecting the public from harm and trying to encourage drug manufacturers to 
submit SNDAs.  Under the final regulations, the FDA reviewed the information to be 
disseminated to ensure that it is not false or misleading
155 and does not pose a significant health 
risk to the public.
156  Moreover, the FDA limited the types of articles that could be considered 
“scientifically sound” to exclude: letters to the editor; abstracts; studies about Phase I trials in 
healthy people; articles which do not contain sufficient substantive discussion of scientific trials; 
and studies with less than four subjects unless the manufacturer can demonstrate that the study 
would help doctors.
157   The regulations outlined the availability of the two exceptions to the 
requirement that a manufacturer file a SNDA.  First, additional studies were considered 
economically prohibitive if additional data were necessary to support the supplemental 
application and if the cost of the studies was more than the expected revenue from the studies 
from the new use minus the expenses associated with the marketing and producing the drug for 
the new use.
158  Second, when considering whether the new studies would be unethical, the FDA 
considered the “degree of acceptance” of the off-label use in the medical community.
159  If the 
FDA granted an exemption for one of these two reasons, then the manufacturer could include in 
their biannual updates to the FDA information relating to the reason that the exemption was 
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granted as well.
160  Outside of these provisions, the active promotion of off-label drugs was 
illegal. 
When Congress enacted these provisions it did so with the intent of getting new treatment 
information into the hands of physicians while protecting patients from aggressive promotion of 
under-researched, dangerous, or ineffective drugs.  However, few drug manufacturers took 
advantage of these provisions to distribute approved materials to physicians.  Rather, 
pharmaceutical companies used the injunction issued against the FDA’s guidance documents 
barring off-label marketing in Friedman and the safe harbor the FDA agreed to in Henney as 
shields under which to conduct limited off-label promotion.  Consequently the FDAMA failed to 
have the significant impact on off-label marketing that Congress intended.  And it failed to 
accomplish either of its objectives: establishing oversight over off-label promotion and getting 
reliable information about treatment options to doctors.  In 2006, these provisions expired under 
the statute’s sunset clause with little notice or fanfare.
161  However, through the FDCA, the FDA 
still maintained the authority to prosecute those corporations that illegally promote their drugs 
off-label.   
C. FDA AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT OF OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
VIOLATIONS 
 
  The FDCA grants to the FDA and Department of Justice (DOJ) broad enforcement 
powers for violations of off-label marketing.  Under the FDCA, the FDA or the Department of 
Justice on behalf of the FDA can bring administrative, civil, injunctive, and criminal actions 
against drug manufacturers for off-label marketing violations.
162  The penalties can be steep 
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ranging from administrative seizure of drugs, civil monetary penalties ranging from $50,000 to 
$1 million per violation, injunctive relief against promotional activities, disgorgement of profits, 
and criminal penalties including up to ten years in prison per violation.
163   
  Historically, enforcement of off-label violations was generally limited to the issuance of a 
public warning label followed by additional precautionary statements to drug manufacturers that 
were promoting drugs for off-label uses.
164  The public reprimand was thought sufficient to deter 
companies from illegally promoting the off-label uses of drugs, and so these warning labels 
rarely resulted in prosecutions.
165 However, in the past decade, the FDA and DOJ have been 
more aggressively enforcing misbranding and off-label violations through the use of civil and 
criminal actions under the FDCA.   
  In 1999, the DOJ criminally prosecuted a drug manufacturer for the first time for illegal 
off-label promotion.  In that case, which resulted in $30 million in criminal fines and $20 million 
in a civil settlement, the government charged Genentech with marketing Protropin, a growth 
hormone for unapproved uses.
166  And, in 2004, Warner-Lambert agreed to a $200 million 
settlement for violations under the Federal Claims Act for fraudulently marketing its drug 
Neurontin for off-label uses and for failing to provide adequate directions for use and introducing 
into interstate commerce a drug for an unapproved use under the FDCA.
167  Most recently, in 
May 2007, the DOJ prosecuted three executives and the drug company that produced Oxycontin 
for criminal misbranding.  In that case, the DOJ argued that the executives were vicariously 
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liable failing to prevent or correct the introduction of Oxycontin into the marketplace for 
unapproved uses.  The company and the executives pled guilty to the charges.  The company 
agreed to pay more than $100 million in civil penalties and the three executives were fined more 
than $34 million in criminal fines and profit disgorgement.
168   
Thus, the FDAMA lifted the complete ban on the dissemination of information regarding 
off-label uses of approved drugs.  However, Congress and the FDA remained unwilling to allow 
manufacturers to promote the off-label uses of their drugs without requiring them to provide data 
supporting the safety and efficacy of the new uses.  With these regulations and enforcement 
actions, the FDA tried to strike a balance between educating doctors and giving the public access 
to information about reliable drugs while still restricting drug manufacturers from overly 
aggressive or unethical promotion of unsafe or ineffective drugs.  However, finding the 
appropriate regulatory and enforcement balance to best promote these often competing aims was 
not easy and Congress allowed the off-label promotion provisions to expire in 2006.   
D. FDA DRAFT GUIDANCE OF GOOD REPRINT PRACTICES OF MEDICAL JOURNAL 
ARTICLES 
   
  In response to the expiration of the off-label dissemination provisions, in February 2008, 
the FDA released Draft Guidance outlining “its current views on the dissemination of medical 
journal articles and medical or scientific reference publications on unapproved uses of approved 
drugs and approved or cleared medical devices to healthcare professionals and healthcare 
entities.”
169  In the Draft Guidance, the FDA recommends a system for the dissemination of 
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materials describing unapproved uses that is almost identical to the off-label promotion 
provisions of the FDAMA.  As under the FDAMA, the Draft Guidelines limit the type of 
materials to be distributed by manufacturers to articles published in peer reviewed, reputable 
scientific or medical journals.
170  The research supporting the articles and authors of the articles 
should not be published at the request of the drug manufacturers and the journal must be 
financially independent of the drug manufacturers.
171  The Draft Guidance also specifies that 
letters to the editor, abstracts, or articles lacking substantial discussions of the research 
methodology should not be distributed. Articles must not discuss Phase I clinical trials and 
should be based on well-controlled scientifically sound clinical trials.    
  Also like the regulations the FDA promulgated under the FDAMA, the Draft Guidance 
states that manufacturers should only distribute unabridged and unedited reprints of articles.
172  
Along with the articles drug manufacturers must include the product’s approved labeling and a 
bibliography of articles discussing the clinical trials and the use of the drug.
173  Manufacturers 
must also provide reprints of articles challenging the findings of the research the manufacturer is 
distributing and all of the materials must be submitted separately from any promotional 
materials.
174  Finally, manufacturers must attach a statement to the article disclosing: the uses 
discussed in the article are unapproved by the FDA; the manufacturer’s interest in the drug; 
funding sources for the research discussed in the article; any financial relationship the 
manufacturer has with the author of the article; and any safety risks associated with the drug.  
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Significantly, the Draft Guidelines do not require manufacturers to send the information to the 
FDA for approval prior to dissemination or require the manufacturer to submit an SNDA. 
The Draft Guidance has not been finalized and is not legally binding on manufacturers. 
However, it reflects the current status of the law in the eyes of the FDA.  More importantly, 
manufacturers that fail to meet the requirements of the guidance open themselves up to 
enforcement actions for illegal off-label promotion.  Thus, if the FDA finalizes the Draft 
Guidance, the regulatory scheme will remain essentially the same as it was under the FDAMA.  
IV.  CRITIQUES OF THE OFF-LABEL MARKETING SCHEME UNDER 
THE FDAMA 
A. THE FDA REGULATIONS OF OFF-LABEL MARKETING ARE TOO RESTRICTIVE 
 
Critics who argue that the FDA’s off-label marketing regulations and guidance are too 
restrictive put forth many arguments in support of their attacks on the current system.  Some 
argue that the statute and regulations are too cumbersome and create a disincentive for drug 
manufacturers to disseminate information to physicians.
175   And others argue that the 
cumbersome regulations stifle innovation and disincentivize drug manufacturers from 
researching new uses for approved drugs.
176 Still, other critics argue that by restricting off-label 
marketing, the government is engaged in the practice of medicine and is interfering with the 
doctor patient relationship.
177 They further argue that the restrictions on off-label marketing 
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prevent doctors from being able to have free flowing scientific exchanges that are necessary to 
improve patient care.
178  In the following sections, this paper will examine these criticisms, 
which focus on either the impact on physicians or the impact on research and medical 
innovation.  While these attacks stem from different places, in the end they converge at a single 
overarching criticism: restrictions on the promotion of off-label uses reduce the availability of 
new and effective treatments and make it far more difficult for patients to receive the care they 
need.  
1.  The FDA’s Off-Label Marketing Regulations Interfere with the Doctor/Patient Relationship 
and Prevent Doctors from Getting Valuable Treatment Information 
  The FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine.  Doctors may prescribe any legally 
marketed drug for any purpose that they believe will help their patient.
179  Off-label uses are 
common in medical practice today.  The precise percentage of prescriptions written off-label is 
unclear.  Beck and Azari write that, among prescription drugs in general, those written for off-
label uses “may account for more than 25% of the approximately 1.6 billion prescriptions written 
each year, with some recent estimates running as high as 60 percent.”
180  The American Medical 
Association and several other sources estimate that roughly half of all prescriptions are written 
for off-label uses.
181  And, the General Accounting Office, in a 1996 report estimated that 90 
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percent of cancer drug use, 80 percent of pediatric drug use, and between 80 and 90 percent of 
drugs used for rare conditions are prescribed off-label.
182  
Off-label uses are not only prevalent in medical practice, in many areas they are cutting 
edge.
183  For cancer patients, off-label treatments are generally considered to be some of the most 
effective treatments available.  A report by the General Accounting Office called off-label use 
“state of the art treatment” in oncology.
184  Off-label uses in the treatment of HIV and AIDS 
have been “dramatic.”
185  Steven Salbu writes that “between ninety and one hundred percent of 
applications, including all of the revolutionary antiretroviral combination therapies, are off-
label.”
186  Indeed, off-label uses are involved in the standard treatment of heart and circulatory 
disease, kidney disease, osteoporosis, spinal fusion surgery, and various uncommon diseases.
187   
Thus, as the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association testified before 
Congress in 1991, “prescribing FDA-approved drugs for off-label (unlabeled) uses often is 
necessary for optimal patient care.”
188  Congress and the FDA have recognized this.
189  And the 
only check on physicians’ power to prescribe off-label is the potential for tort liability and 
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“gradually dwindling vestiges of insurance company and health plan policies that deny coverage 
of off-label applications, where such policies are still legal.”
190  
However, physicians must be aware of the off-label treatments in order to prescribe them 
to their patients. Many critics of the FDA regulations argue that the restrictions on off-label 
marketing thwart the access of patients who could have benefited from these drugs had only their 
doctors been aware of their off-label uses.
191  These critics make two main attacks: first, they 
argue that the restrictions prevent doctors from receiving reliable information about new uses; 
and second, they argue that the regulations intrude upon the doctor patient relationship.  
a. The Regulations Prevent Doctors from Getting Information About New Uses 
Doctors rely primarily on drug manufacturers to learn about drugs for their approved 
uses.
192  In some cases, drug manufacturers may provide doctors with information about the off-
label uses of certain drugs.  However, because drug manufacturers must endure significant costs, 
such as supplemental clinical trials and increased reporting costs, critics argue that the under the 
current regulations it is simply not cost effective for many drug manufacturers to send doctors 
information about off-label uses.  Many doctors then are not receiving information from drug 
manufacturers about potential treatments that could benefit their patients.
193   
Even when they are permitted to disseminate information to doctors, drug manufacturers 
may only send full reprints of articles from peer reviewed medical or scientific journals.  For off-
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label uses doctors, then, must get their information either from medical literature
194 or informally 
through their peers.
195   
Doctors, who spend most of their days seeing patients, do not have time to keep up with 
all of the medical literature.  When sponsoring legislation to reduce the restrictions on off-label 
marketing, Senator Bill Frist, a former heart surgeon, said: “If a conscientious doctor were to 
read two medical articles before retiring each night, he would have fallen 550 years behind in his 
reading at the end of the first year.”
196  By limiting the means through which doctors can obtain 
information to journal articles, the FDA regulations then limit not only the type of information 
but also the amount of information that doctors can get.   
Doctors have always been allowed to get information from each other informally.  
However, critics, including doctors and other medical groups, have long argued that these 
informal channels are insufficient.  In 1997, the American Medical Association made it one of its 
policy goals to  
 
“seek to persuade FDA to ensure physicians have greater access to information about 
unlabeled (off-label) uses of medications citing the prevalence and clinical importance of 
prescribing drugs for unlabeled uses . . . and the critical need for physicians to have 
access to accurate and unbiased information about unlabeled uses of prescription 
drugs.”
197   
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Without access to information about off-label uses, doctors will have very little information to 
share.  
Salbu argues that doctors will notice trends and develop theories about effective off-label 
treatments that they will test informally in their practices.
198  He maintains that, for doctors 
involved in large networks, these informal findings can be a “likely source of some innovative 
drug applications.”
199  However, doctors who are practicing as sole practitioners or who lack a 
large network to tap into will not be able to obtain this information.
200  Moreover, while there is 
value in the information developed and shared in these informal networks, it is merely anecdotal; 
in order for it to have a widespread impact on patient treatment, it must be formally tested and 
broadly shared across the medical community.  “Manufacturers have the greatest incentive, as 
well as resources, to spread the news of research findings that support new and beneficial off-
label uses if their products.  Liberalized off-label promotion therefore should yield the most 
progressive medical practice.”
201 
b. The FDA’s Regulations Intrude on the Doctor Patient Relationship 
Some critics assert that limiting doctors’ access to information in this way interferes with 
the doctor patient relationship.  Doctors are in the best position both to evaluate the needs of their 
patients and evaluate the available treatment options.
202 The reason that we have such few 
regulatory controls on doctors is because we want them to be able to assess patients’ individual 
needs and tailor a treatment plan to meet those needs.
203  “This professional autonomy is 
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considered the cornerstone of medical practice.”
204  And, it is the reason we allow, and at times, 
encourage doctors to prescribe drugs off-label.  “Once it is accepted that off-label uses are 
desirable, it is difficult to maintain that doctors should be shielded from truthful information 
concerning how to use a product for an off-label use.  Patients will benefit from having their 
doctors informed about off-label uses.”
205  
Unlike patients who have little scientific background, doctors are able to evaluate the 
information they receive from pharmaceutical companies about the drugs they prescribe, and so 
the FDA should be less concerned about them being mislead or confused by communications 
from drug manufacturers.
206  Doctors are fully aware of the FDA’s drug approval process and 
know the risks for off-label prescription.  Moreover, under the learned intermediary doctrine, 
doctors bear the risk of prescribing a drug off-label through tort law so they may as well have all 
of the information necessary to make the best decisions for their patients.
207  “Good decisions are 
made with as much information as possible.  Good healthcare decisions likewise should be made 
with as much data on the use of drugs for non-approved indications as possible.”
208  By 
preventing doctors to get information about off-label uses, the FDA is preventing physicians and 
patients from being able to make informed and impartial decisions.
209 
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2.  The FDA’s Off-Label Marketing Regulations Stifle Innovation and Create Disincentives 
for Manufacturers to Develop and Disseminate Useful Information to the Medical Field 
Given the prevalence of off-label practices in modern medicine, it is important to know if 
these treatments are safe and effective.
210  To garner the relevant data and information, research 
about off-label uses must continue even after the FDA has granted approval for a drug.  While 
pharmaceutical research takes place in a variety of settings including government laboratories, 
universities, and non-profit research centers,
211 the majority of pharmaceutical research in this 
country is funded and conducted by drug manufacturers.
212  However, the FDA regulations do 
not currently require companies to conduct this research if they do not wish to send doctors 
articles on the off-label uses of their drugs; given the cost of conducting this research, critics 
argue that most manufacturers will not likely undertake this research.
213    Some manufacturers 
might decide to research off-label uses, but “whether this occurs will depend upon the economic 
incentives involved, and there is reason to believe that these incentives are less than robust.”
214   
Thus, rather than incentivize pharmaceutical companies to conduct research into off-label 
uses of pre-approved drugs, the FDA’s regulations are overly cumbersome and make it 
financially unfeasible for drug companies to conduct this research.  Even if it is financially 
feasible for the company to conduct the research, the costs of doing so are particularly high and 
get passed onto the consumer. These critics typically cite three reasons why the regulations 
disincentive research: first, the drug manufacturers cannot widely disseminate information about 
off-label uses; second, the SNDA process is too cumbersome and expensive; and third, the drug 
manufacturers’ competitors benefit more from their research than they do.   
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a. Drug manufacturers cannot widely disseminate information about off-label uses 
 
“Production of knowledge about pharmaceutical products is the central objective of 
pharmaceutical research and development, supplemented by substantial public section 
expenditures for medical research and the activities of a wide array of clinicians and 
academicians. Before that knowledge constitutes useful information, however, it must be 
disseminated to the practitioners who can use it. Dissemination of pharmaceutical information 
is an industry unto itself, involving medical journals, textbooks, consensus conferences under 
governmental auspices, and substantial manufacturer expenditures on promotion. Thus, 
pharmaceutical research and development and pharmaceutical promotion are complementary 
activities.”
215 
 
  If drug manufacturers cannot promote the information revealed by their research, they 
have no reason to conduct the research. By banning off-label promotion, the FDA significantly 
reduces drug manufacturers’ incentives to research new uses for already approved drugs.
216  A 
substantial portion of a drug’s market share can come from off-label sales.
217  And drug 
manufacturers may be motivated to research a drug’s off-label uses if they can widely publicize 
the new uses of their products in order to increase sales of a drug.  However, due to the FDA 
marketing regulation, drug manufacturers are unlikely to reach the number of physicians and 
health care workers that they would need to reach in order to increase their sales significantly.
218 
Since drugs can often achieve significant sales for off-label uses without any formal research 
substantiating the efficacy of the drug for the new use,
219 the marginal increases in sales that 
companies may be able to get by sending FDA approved materials to a limited number of 
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physicians are insufficient to justify the significant costs of research.
220  And to be eligible to 
disseminate these very limited materials about new uses to physicians drug manufacturers must 
submit a SNDA to the FDA, which is a demanding and costly process.
221    
Further, the risk of undertaking clinical trials is high because there is a chance that the 
trials may reveal a negative result.
222  Thus, given the high cost and high risk of the trials, drug 
manufacturers are not likely going to undertake new trials unless they could significantly 
increase the drug’s sales.  The increased sales projections are depressed by the FDA's restrictions 
on off-label promotion.   
Elizabeth Weeks argues that drug manufacturers who send information to physicians 
about new uses open themselves up to regulatory sanctions if they fail to meet the FDA's 
complicated policy on dissemination.  The recent DOJ investigations and prosecutions for off-
label promotions further increase the risks to drug manufacturers.  These “increased regulatory 
scrutiny and potential sanctions may provide disincentives for manufacturers to avail themselves 
of the approved dissemination option.  Instead, they may continue to rely on unapproved or 
underground dissemination, such as informal communication among doctors or unsponsored 
studies published in journals, that does not carry the same threat of sanctions.”
223 
b. FDA's Supplemental New Drug Application Process is Cumbersome and Expensive 
Weeks also argues that in addition to the limitations on disseminating information about 
new research, drug manufacturers may not research new uses for approved drugs because the 
process of having a new use recognized by the FDA is too cumbersome and costly.  To have 
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more than one use approved for a drug, the manufacturer must submit an SNDA.  The SNDA 
process can be even more expensive than the original NDA process because drug manufacturers 
have to submit new Phase II and III data about efficacy, which are the most expensive studies to 
run, and the FDA gives supplemental applications lower priority than original approvals so they 
may take longer.  While the FDA regulations except pharmaceutical companies from having to 
submit SNDAs for economic hardship, the FDA has made it clear that it will not grant these 
exemptions liberally.
224 
  When submitting a drug for original approval, drug manufacturers will usually submit a 
NDA for a minimal number of uses to get their drug to market as quickly as possible.
225  If they 
have reason to believe that there may be an unapproved use for their drug, they can sponsor a 
study of the drug, the results of which will be made public in a medical or scientific study.
226  
This study does not have to meet the stringent methodological standards of an FDA approved 
study however.
227  The only incentive then that manufacturers have to submit an SNDA is to be 
able to send articles directly to physicians or to change the labeling so that they can promote the 
drug for the new use.  As discussed above, the ability to send the article to doctors directly rather 
than waiting for doctors to discover the published article on their own, will likely not increase 
sales enough to make the increased costs of vigorous research and administrative delay 
worthwhile.  While a labeling change could allow manufacturers to significantly increase 
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product sales, the fact that generic drugs also benefit from the labeling change reduces the 
original manufacturer’s expected profits from the new use substantially.
228 
 
C. DRUG MANUFACTURERS’ COMPETITORS BENEFIT MORE FROM THEIR RESEARCH THAN 
THEY DO 
 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 significantly 
eroded patent protection for new drugs allowing generic drug manufacturers to make a generic 
version of a drug while the original drug manufacturer’s patent was still in force.
229  The Act also 
accelerated the FDA’s approval of generic drugs.
230  Katherine Helm argues that early entry of 
pharmaceutical drugs gives patients access to cheaper drugs, but it also means that the original 
drug manufacturers have less incentive to seek FDA approval for a new use.
231 
  Once a generic version of a drug enters the marketplace for the first approved use, it will 
be prescribed for all on- and off-label uses.
232  Moreover, many states have laws requiring 
physicians to prescribe and pharmacists to dispense available generic versions of drugs for all on 
and off-label uses for which it is prescribed.  Many of these state laws prohibit insurance 
companies from refusing to reimburse generics that are prescribed off-label just because they are 
prescribed for an off-label use.
233  And, federal Medicare policies cover off-label uses that are 
considered medically acceptable.
234   Thus, according to Helm, if a drug manufacturer submits a 
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SNDA for a new use, any new market they create from the new use is able to substitute the 
generic for the original drug as soon as a generic is available.  Since it would be the same if the 
manufacturer did not submit the SNDA, there is little incentive for a drug manufacturer to invest 
in the application. “In sum, off-label uses are highly profitable for pharmaceutical manufacturers 
prior to generic entry, and are highly profitable for generic manufacturers thereafter.”
235  
Moreover, because generic drugs can come to market so quickly and the SNDA approval process 
takes such a long time, drug manufacturers will have only a small window in which to reap 
profits from any new uses for which they get FDA approval.
236 
B. FDA REGULATIONS OF OFF-LABEL MARKETING ARE INADEQUATE TO PROTECT 
PATIENTS 
 
“Before the FDAMA was adopted, the FDA asserted that permitting drug companies to 
promote off-label use would remove incentives to obtain definitive clinical study data, weaken 
the goal of evidence-based medicine, erode the drug efficacy requirements, and harm patients by 
unstudied uses that actually lead to bad results or that are merely ineffective.”
237 Those arguing 
for tighter restrictions on off-label marketing essentially make the same arguments today.
238  An 
examination of these criticisms reveals that no matter how varied they all appear, they all 
ultimately make the same basic objection: the lack of regulatory and governmental control over 
the promotion and use of off-label uses “endangers human health and human life.”
239 
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1. FDA’s Regulations Discourage Drug Manufacturers from Researching the Safety and Efficacy 
of New Uses 
 
Critics such as James O’Reilly, Amy Dalal, and Karen Bradshaw argue that the  
FDAMA’s relaxation of the off-label promotion restrictions removed any real incentive for drug 
manufacturers to conduct the rigorous clinical trials necessary to demonstrate the safety and 
efficacy of their product for off-label uses.
240  Doctors can learn of the off-label uses of drugs 
through informal networks and manufacturers can sell their products for off-label uses without 
having to expend the resources to prove the product is safe and effective. They, therefore, have 
little incentive to invest in the expensive research required to relabel the product to reflect the 
new indication.
241  Moreover, manufacturers have little incentive to research a drug that is 
already selling well for off-label uses because they could discover that the drug is unsafe and be 
forced to pull it from the market.
242   
Even under the current regulations, some manufacturers will not research off-label uses 
after a drug has been approved.  However, critics argue that unless the FDA monitors these 
studies, they are at best ineffective at promoting safety and efficiency for two reasons.  First, 
manufacturers will likely conduct less scientifically rigorous trials than they would be required to 
perform under the FDA’s standards because they are less expensive and because they may 
produce a more favorable result.  Even though these studies have not met the methodological 
standards that the FDA requires to demonstrate safety and effectiveness, the manufacturer will 
nevertheless be able to publicize the results by publishing them in a widely read medical journal 
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that will reach physicians and healthcare workers.
 243  Doctors and others who hear of the news 
may thus think that the drug is reliable and safe for the new indication even though the study 
may not demonstrate that to the FDA’s standards. 
Second, the FDA regulations do not require manufacturers to reveal the results from 
clinical trials.  Manufacturers who discover results that may be damaging to sales are unlikely to 
reveal them to the public.
244  Michael Oates argues that this failure to require manufacturers to 
reveal clinical trial results to the public even if they are not conducted under FDA review is a 
huge shortcoming of the regulatory scheme.
245 
2.  FDA’s Regulations Encourage Drug Manufacturers to Bypass its Review Process 
 
  Critics also note that the ability of manufacturers to sell and market drugs off-label is a 
disincentive to bypass FDA review even before a drug has gotten to market.  As noted above, 
drug companies can often achieve significant sales for off-label uses.
246  These sales are 
particularly profitable because the drug company did not have to get FDA approval for the use 
and therefore did not have to expend the significant capital and time in doing so.
247   Thus, drug 
manufacturers have incentives to “game the system” and push a drug through for initial approval 
using the minimum number of clinical trials needed to get approval for the most basic use of the 
drug knowing that they can still sell the drug off-label for other uses at greater profit margins.
248 
Even if they cannot “promote the drug” directly to physicians under the current regulations, 
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pharmaceutical companies have found pretextual ways to “advertise” their drug to doctors.  As 
Marcia Angell wrote in her book, The Truth About Drug Companies, drug companies use 
professional education courses to promote drugs off-label: 
“You do that by carrying out ‘research’ that falls way below the standard required for 
FDA approval, then educating doctors about favorable results.  That way you can 
circumvent the law.  You could say you were not marketing for unapproved uses; you 
were merely disseminating the results of research to doctors . . . But it would be bogus 
education about bogus research.  It would really be marketing.”
249 
 
Even though this so called marketing that Dr. Angell describes in her book may be prohibited, 
the FDA lacks the resources to effectively regulate this behavior and even more blatant 
violations of the ban on off-label promotion.
 250   It can thus do little to stop manufacturers who 
use impermissible channels and means to promote the off-label uses of their drugs.
251  
 
3.  FDA’s Regulations Allow Drug Manufacturers to Treat Patients Like Guinea Pigs 
a. FDA’s Regulations Allow Experimental Drugs into the Marketplace  
Because drugs being prescribed off-label have not undergone FDA review for the new 
uses, some critics argue that drugs prescribed off-label are essentially the same as experimental 
drugs.
252 Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy group, asserted that by loosening the off-label 
marketing restrictions, the FDAMA forces patients to “become part of an uncontrolled 
experiment where no one is keeping track of who’s helped and who’s hurt.”
253   
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Public Citizen and other critics argue that a primary purpose of the FDA review of new 
drugs is to determine not only the safety of the drug, but also the proper dosage for a given use 
and potential side effects and risks at that dosage.
254  Drugs that are being used off-label have not 
necessarily been tested at the dosage at which they are being prescribed, or for interactions with 
certain drugs, or in the population to whom they are being prescribed. Thus, from a patient safety 
perspective, in these situations off-label drugs are indistinguishable from unapproved drugs that 
have also not been scrutinized in these ways.
255  
b. FDA’s Regulations Fail to Inform Their Patients When Their Doctor Prescribes Them a Drug 
Off-Label 
  Margaret Johns, in her article Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-
Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, faults the FDA’s regulations for failing to force 
doctors to tell patients when they are prescribing a drug off-label.
256   In this way she argues that 
patients are unwittingly subject to the risk of taking “investigational” medications.
257  Johns 
maintains that the FDA’s regulations give doctors too much autonomy in making decisions for 
patients and do not adequately protect patients from doctors who may have been influenced by 
drug company marketing.
258  She argues that when a patient receives a prescription from her 
doctor, she assumes mistakenly that the drug has been found safe and effective according to the 
FDA’s standards.  Since the patient is ultimately the one bearing the risk of taking a drug that has 
not been fully tested, Johns argues that the patient should be able to make a fully informed 
decision about whether to take the risk.  Thus she argues that the drug’s off-label status should be 
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disclosed to the patient because “surely patients would want to know the doctor’s basis for 
recommending an off-label treatment.”
259 
V. POPULAR “SOLUTIONS” AND SUGGESTED REFORMS TO THE 
OFF-LABEL PROMOTION REGULATIONS 
 
  Scholars and practitioners have suggested a variety of solutions to address these and other 
criticisms of the off-label marketing system.  In fact, the academic literature on FDA's off-label 
marketing regulations is replete with proposals for how to better maximize patient access to 
effective and affordable treatments, promote research and innovation, and protect patients from 
unsafe drugs.  Authors have suggested solutions ranging from complex guidelines for the FDA to 
employ when considering whether to impose rigid or strict research requirements for off-label 
uses to tax reforms.  However, the most commonly suggested changes are: deregulation of off-
label promoting;
260 legally mandated informed consent;
261 changing FDA policies and 
procedures;
262 and, patent reform.
263  Whether the changes are sweeping or minor, a close 
examination of each of them reveals that they are at best ineffective and, in some cases, would 
cause more harm than good.   
A. DEREGULATING OFF-LABEL PROMOTION 
 
Scholars such as J. Howard Beales, John Calfee, Paul Rubin, Steven Salbu, Edmund 
Polubinski, Charles Walsh, Alissa Pyrish, and others have argued that the regulation and 
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restriction of off-label marketing slows medical innovation and prevents doctors and patients 
from getting the information they need to make well-informed treatment decisions.
 264  Some of 
these scholars advocate complete deregulation of off-label promotions and others prefer only 
partial deregulation.  They all agree, however, that keeping pharmaceutical companies from 
disseminating “truthful information” to doctors about the potential off-label uses of their 
products has “thwarted the access of [patients]” to potential life-saving and life-improving 
treatments.
265   
  These critics contend that market forces, rather than regulation will best minimize the 
risks associated with off-label use.  Moreover, market forces will better support the rapid 
dissemination of valuable information to doctors and patients.
266    Even without FDA oversight, 
drug manufacturers will not act irresponsibly by promoting drugs they know are dangerous or 
ineffective for fear of reputational repercussions and tort litigation.  Even if this deregulation 
would sacrifice some degree of protection “the invaluable benefits of off-label practices 
outweighs some loss in the preservation of public safety from unproven applications.”
267  In the 
aggregate, by getting more information about treatments to more patients, deregulation would 
save more lives than the complex protectionist scheme currently in place.
268 
  Some scholars advocate for partial deregulation.  Steven Salbu argues for keeping the 
restriction on off-label marketing to physicians and healthcare professionals as well as the 
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disclosure requirements.
269  He suggests supplementing the deregulated system with mandated 
informed patient consent and tort reform to make manufacturers responsible for the negligent 
promotion of unsafe drugs and for dishonest or inaccurate marketing of off-label uses.
270 
Polubinski focuses on protecting First Amendment rights.  He proposes a requirement that drug 
manufacturers promoting drugs off-label be required to disclose: the manufacturers interest in the 
promotional activity and support it provided to the research, the extent to which the treatments 
being promoted constitute unapproved uses, and the official labeling of the drugs to recipients of 
educational support or written materials.
271   
Elizabeth Weeks suggests liberalizing the current restrictions by permitting 
manufacturers to send a wider variety of materials or by only requiring pre-dissemination 
notification rather than approval.
272  Similarly, Katherine Helm suggests reducing some of the 
SNDA requirements for already approved drugs supplemented by increased post-marketing 
surveillance and risk assessment.
273 
  The appeals to deregulate off-label marketing are pleasing in theory.  They play to our 
capitalist sensibilities and to the American ideals of a free market and innovation.  However, in 
practice, these ideas are not only impractical but they are dangerous.  Millions of Americans rely 
on prescription drugs everyday.  And doctors need reliable information about the benefits and 
risks of drugs to treat their patients.  The reason that jurisdiction over drug promotion was taken 
from the FTC and given to the FDA in 1962 was because doctors complained en masse that 
under the FTC’s loose advertising guidelines “drug companies tended to emphasize the positive 
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features and advantages of the drugs but did not describe side effects, contraindications, adverse 
reactions, and warnings adequately.”
274  There is no reason to believe that without adequate 
oversight and regulation, drug companies would not revert to these practices for off-label and on-
label uses of drugs.   
  However, for on-label drugs, doctors would be able to find adverse information about the 
drug easily.  For off-label uses, this information would not be available unless the manufacturer 
voluntarily conducted trials about the safety and efficacy of the new use.  While proponents of 
deregulation of off-label marketing argue that loosened restrictions will stimulate research on 
already approved drugs to be able to capture a larger portion of the market share, this seems 
unlikely. Drug manufacturers have few incentives to research safety and effectiveness if they can 
market the drug without expending the money to do so and without risking discovery an adverse 
side effect.   
What proponents of deregulation ignore is that drug companies could likely increase their 
sales as much or more by investing in advertising dollars than in detailed research about the new 
use.  Though they may have to conduct basic research to discover if the drug has any off-label 
uses, it is in the drug companies best interest to keep these tests as narrow as possible so that they 
will not learn of any adverse side effects or contraindications that might weaken their sales.  
Moreover, even if a drug company invested in research about a new use, it would still then have 
to invest heavily in promotion to get this information out.  If there is no regulation of their 
promotional activities, then it seems a much smarter business model to just skip the expensive 
and risky research and opt instead for the widespread and slick advertising campaign.  
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Proponents of deregulation of marketing argue that the drug has already been approved 
and determined to be safe by the FDA, so the risk it poses to the public is minor.  While off-label 
prescriptions have been tested for Phase I trials and so are non-toxic if taken under the same 
conditions and dosages for which they have been approved, there is nothing to indicate that they 
are safe at different dosages or in combination with other drugs.  As we saw in the phen-fen 
fiasco, drugs that may be safe by themselves can be quite harmful when taken in concert.  Phen-
fen was only prescribed for a few years and yet it caused heart valve damage in at least 285,000 
people.
275  Had the drug manufacturer been able to advertise the off-label combination directly to 
doctors in a widespread promotional campaign the number of people harmed would likely have 
been considerably higher.   
The market plays some role in regulating the behavior of drug manufacturers.  Certainly, 
drug manufacturers certainly do not want the negative publicity and tort liability that comes with 
marketing a dangerous drug.  However, without regulation and oversight from the FDA, we 
leave it in the discretion of the drug companies to decide how many lives to risk by marketing a 
potentially unsafe off-label use for a drug. If the consequences of so doing are the damage to 
reputation and potential litigation liability, then a drug manufacturer will likely operate as do car 
manufacturers and other less regulated manufacturing industries when calculating these risks.  
They will determine the potential profits they can get from selling their product which they know 
to be dangerous and then subtract the potential tort liability and reputational damage.  If selling 
the drug will produce more profits than it will cost, then the manufacturer will likely go ahead 
and sell it.  When a new drug can bring in billions of dollars of revenue, it is likely that 
manufacturers will choose to gamble with people’s lives somewhat frequently.  We accept this 
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reality in the auto industry perhaps because consumers can more easily detect the risks associated 
with cars.  For example we know that a small car is more dangerous than a big one, a car made 
of steel is safer than one of aluminum, cars with gas tanks in places likely to get hit in an 
accident are more dangerous with cars with gas tanks in shielded areas.  However, a patient 
cannot look at a pill and determine if it will be safe.  We thus need the FDA, which has the 
resources and expertise required to determine drug safety to oversee the marketing of drugs to 
doctors and patients.  
Moreover, even if an off-label drug does not cause direct harm to a patient, we want our 
patients to get the most effective treatments.  However, if drug companies have no incentive to 
conduct research on the effectiveness of their drug, or are only motivated to conduct shoddy 
research that puts their product in the best light, there will be no way for doctors to gather that 
information.  Doctors do have scientific training to be able to see through mere advertising 
tricks.  However, we do not want doctors to have to spend the time to research each drug 
company’s research methods to determine which companies claims are most accurate.  And if 
drug companies are not conducting research on off-label uses or are not compelled to share their 
data with the public, even well trained doctors will have little else to turn to but the marketing 
campaigns.  Without oversight from the FDA ensuring that drug companies are providing only 
honest, accurate, and complete information to doctors, it is more likely that doctors’ selection of 
drugs will be based on the effectiveness of the advertising campaign rather than the effectiveness 
of the drug.   - 57 - 
B.  INFORMED PATIENT CONSENT 
 
In the midst of the phen-fen controversy in the late 1990s, scholars and the popular media 
began calling for expanding the informed doctrine to include off-label status.
276  The calls for 
informed consent have died down in the national media. However, scholars and academics still 
propose informed consent as a cure all for whatever problems they identify with the current off-
label marketing regulations.
277  The arguments put forth by Steven Salbu and Margaret Johns 
typify the way scholars on different sides of the debate suggest employing informed consent to 
improve the off-label marketing regulations. 
Johns argues that the current FDA regulations are insufficient to protect patients from 
aggressive marketing of off-label uses to doctors and potentially insufficient research on the 
unapproved uses.  Johns then proposes supplementing the current FDA regulations by expanding 
state tort law doctrine of informed consent to require full patient disclosure whenever a doctor 
prescribes a drug off-label.
278  While she admits that this may not reduce the health risks of under 
researched drugs,
279 she argues that current scheme ignores “patient autonomy and self-
determination.”
280  Because there are inherent risks associated with taking a drug off-label that 
the FDA cannot make up for through its regulatory scheme, patients should know of these risks 
when deciding whether to take a drug.
281  Further, Johns argues that doctors’ decisions about 
which drugs to prescribe are frequently influenced by pharmaceutical companies.  She thus 
advocates for mandatory disclosure to patients of any “drug company influences that create 
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conflicts of interest or the appearance of conflict of interests.”
282 Disclosure of conflicts of 
interests will make patients more cautious when taking prescribed medications.   Patient caution, 
Johns contends, will counterbalance the excessive influence of pharmaceutical marketing and 
possibly save lives.
283   Moreover, she argues that disclosure of conflicts of interest will prevent 
doctors from engaging in “the most egregious” practices, such as prescribing unnecessary drugs 
or high risk drugs because of a financial relationship with a pharmaceutical company.
284 
  In contrast, Salbu advocates for informed patient consent as part of his proposal for the 
almost complete deregulation of off-label marketing.  Salbu argues that the complex FDA 
regulations and rules are too broad.  He suggests then that we shift some of the burden and 
responsibility for patient protection from the FDA to patients in the “interests of free speech and 
medical advancement.”
285  According to Salbu, full patient disclosure is the best way to achieve 
the shift of decision-making to patients.
286  When prescribing a drug for an off-label use, doctors 
should have to disclose that the FDA has not approved the off-label treatment and tell them the 
potential risks and benefits of taking the drug.  “This approach empowers patients and erodes 
what can be an insultingly paternalistic institution that treats patients more as objects than as 
active participants in their own treatments.”
287 
  Salbu and Johns are correct that informed consent will give patients more autonomy in 
that they till have more information with which to decide whether to take a drug.  However, the 
information they have will be almost meaningless because patients lack the scientific and 
medical background to fully understand the risks they are taking. More importantly, much of the 
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information about safety and risks that would be relevant to their decision is unavailable to them 
and their doctor.   
Under an expanded informed consent regime, doctors would have to tell their patients if 
they prescribe a drug off-label. Without understanding the FDA approval process, simply 
knowing that a drug is “off-label” gives the patient very little information on which to make a 
decision about whether or not to take the drug.  Under the current informed consent doctrine, 
doctors are required to tell patients the risks and benefits of treatments they prescribe whether or 
not the treatment is off-label.
288  So, if the doctor is aware of any risks, she will tell her patient 
whether or not there is an informed consent requirement.  And if the doctor does not think the 
drug particularly risky, without required informed consent she will not say anything to the 
patient.  The only thing that informed consent adds is that, in this case, the doctor must tell the 
patient that the drug has been approved as safe to take for another use but also works for the one 
that will help the patient.  Likely this information will do little to raise alarm bells in patients’ 
minds because they will know that the FDA has approved the drug and allowed it onto the 
market.  Thus, the patient is in the same place under an informed consent regime than he was in 
without one: in the case of a treatment that the doctor views as risky, her doctor must inform her 
of the risks involved in the treatment.  In the case of treatments that her doctor does not view as 
risky, she must rely on her doctor’s belief that the treatment is safe.   
Because informed consent adds little to protect patient’s safety, it is insufficient to 
compensate for the lack of FDA oversight over off-label marketing as Steven Salbu suggests.  
Similarly doctors who prescribe drugs because of special relationships with drug manufacturers, 
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are liable in tort and so adding an informed consent requirement that doctors reveal conflicts of 
interest adds little to patient safety.   
  Not only may the informed consent requirement be ineffective to protect patient safety, 
but Beck and Azari also argue that it actually hinders doctors in providing quality medical care.  
They argue that the FDA status of a drug is irrelevant because it is not “medical information” 
that can help a patient make an informed decision about treatment options.
289  Requiring doctors 
to inform patients of drugs off-label status would force physicians, who are already struggling to 
keep up with medical advances that can help their patients, to learn and explain the complex 
FDA regulatory scheme.  Moreover, they argue that this expanded informed consent doctrine 
would generate a huge number of new claims, “given the ubiquity of off-label use.  Nothing 
would be gained, and much valuable time would be lost, if physicians had to divert their energies 
from treating their patients and keeping abreast of medical advances to reviewing FDA 
administrative law.”
290  Beck and Azari further contend that patients would be confused and 
mislead by the information because it might cause them to overestimate the risk associated with 
taking a drug off-label; it could thus frighten patients from the therapies that would be best for 
their health.
291 
  However, Beck and Azari’s predictions seem a bit overstated.  While expanding the 
informed consent doctrine would likely lead to an increase in tort claims, it is easy enough for 
doctors to protect themselves by disclosing the off-label status of the drugs.   Moreover, doctors 
likely already understand the FDA drug approval process enough to explain it to their patients 
without having to read the Federal Register or take “a course in the federal regulation of drugs 
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and medical devices.”
292   It would likely not be as cumbersome a requirement as they suggest.  
However, even though the harm involved in telling patients that a drug is prescribed off-label 
may be minimal, so too is the benefit.  It will thus not serve to replace the FDA in protecting 
patients from unsafe drugs nor will it significantly bulwark patient protection as an addition to 
the current regulatory scheme. 
C. CHANGING FDA POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
 
Rather than focusing on the overarching statutory or regulatory scheme, another group of 
scholars focus on changing the FDA's processes and procedures to address the problems that 
they have identified with the off-label marketing scheme.  The specific policy and procedure 
proposals that scholars advocate are diverse.  However, these proposals are generally based on 
one of two presumptions.  One group of scholars believes that the government has “tipped the 
scales towards the end of tightly restricting drug promotion and the drug manufacturer’s 
freedoms to inform the public about their products.”
293  However, the government’s efforts to 
protect patient safety have cost patients access to new drugs and innovative treatments.  These 
authors thus propose changes to FDA policies and protocols that will encourage research and 
make the regulations less cumbersome for drug manufacturers.  The other group of scholars 
argues that the deregulation of off-label marketing places research and economic well being of 
pharmaceutical companies ahead of patient safety.  These scholars then propose changes that 
augment FDA review of testing and marketing of new uses of approved drugs.   
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1.  Liberalizing Off-Label Marketing Restrictions  
 
  Katherine Helm argues that the combination of the cumbersome pre-market approval 
process for new uses of approved drugs and the introduction of early entry of generic drugs into 
the pharmaceutical market “stifle the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to obtain further 
patent protection on and regulatory approval for new uses of approved drugs already on the 
market.”
294  Helm then seeks to speed up the pace at which drugs are approved for new uses and 
brought to market.  Getting drugs approved for new uses sooner will encourage drug 
manufacturers to conduct rigorous clinical trials about new uses because they will be able to 
profit from the new uses before generics enter the market.  It will also help patients who will 
have increased access to new treatments earlier.   
She thus advocates for reducing the requirements for pre-market approval for new uses 
for approved drugs supplemented by increased post-market surveillance and “risk assessment of 
approved drugs, to identify non-evidence-based prescribing practices and to distinguish between 
those that are clinically reasonable from those that may be of concern.”
295  Helm praises the 2007 
FDA Amendments for focusing on increased post-market surveillance of drugs.
296  
Increased post-market surveillance of drugs will help to identify potential off-label uses 
and detect safety hazards that were not revealed during the pre-market clinical trial period.  
However, post-market surveillance cannot prevent unsafe drugs or drug combinations from 
getting to the market in the first place.  Moreover, even with post-market review, it will likely 
take a significant amount of time for the research to detect adverse effects.  In the time it takes to 
detect this danger and remove the drug from the market, hundreds of thousands of patients could 
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be harmed or even killed.  For example, phen-fen was popular only between 1992 and 1997.
297   
In that time at least 285,000 people had heart valve damage from taking the drug combination.
298 
Post-market surveillance may catch adverse effects more quickly than they were discovered in 
the phen-fen situation.  However, under Helm’s regime, the drug manufacturer would be 
marketing the drug to a widespread audience while the data was being generated, meaning the 
number of patients taking it in the meantime might dwarf even the numbers who were taking 
phen-fen.  Moreover, even if the drug is not unsafe, it may be ineffective and we do not want 
large numbers of people taking an ineffective drug and loosing valuable treatment time, while we 
wait to find out if it is really effective.   
Thus, while Helm’s suggestion of post-market research is a good idea to supplement the 
knowledge we have about drugs that are already approved, it will not protect patients from 
unsafe or ineffective drugs that get onto the market place.  We may be willing to accept this risk 
for patients on a small scale so that we can get effective treatments to them.  However, should we 
allow widespread marketing of drugs conditional mostly on post-market research, a huge number 
of patients could be injured while we wait to find out if the drug is actually safe.  In the case of 
drugs for life threatening or severely debilitating diseases, such as HIV and AIDS, Helm’s 
proposal for an abbreviated pre-market approval process supplemented by post-market 
surveillance makes sense because the potential risks of the drug are likely less then the patients’ 
certain outcomes without it.  However, the FDA already employs such a system.
299  For drugs 
where the benefits are not that significant, the risk then seems too high.  
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Elizabeth Weeks argues that the liberalized dissemination provisions of the FDAMA 
intended to get reliable information about innovated treatments into the hands of doctors.
300  
However, the cumbersome and time consuming approval process for supplemental new drug 
applications keeps drug manufacturers from taking advantage of the provisions.  Weeks suggests 
that the FDA prioritize approval of supplemental applications that are submitted by 
manufacturers seeking permission to promote drugs for unapproved uses.  FDA approval is 
advantageous to manufacturers because it increases a drug’s marketability and increases sales.  
She argues that priority review will “protect FDA’s mandate to ensure that accurate and thorough 
research is conducted regarding the safety and efficacy of new uses, while still providing an 
incentive to manufacturers in the form of expedited approval.”
301  Thus, through priority review, 
the FDA will be able to achieve the dual aims of protecting patients from unsafe or ineffective 
drugs while at the same time promoting innovation and getting new treatments to market 
faster.
302 
Of course it is a good idea to expedite getting new treatments to market.  Unfortunately, 
the FDA is an agency of limited resources.  Without an additional funding, if the FDA prioritizes 
all supplemental drug applications, it must either demote the priority of other applications or 
slow down the approval process for all non-priority applications even more.  Weeks’ proposal 
then will not ensure that more new treatments get to the patients who need them more quickly.  
Rather, she is simply trading which class of drugs gets into the hands of patients sooner.  
Certainly, expedited review of supplemental drug applications for companies wishing to market 
drugs for off-label uses will get these drugs to patients sooner.  However, the cost of so doing 
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will be that other drugs, perhaps new drugs or generics will get to market and to the patients who 
need them more slowly.   Weeks’ proposal then simply trades one problem for another.   
2. Strengthening Off-Label Restrictions 
 
  Michael Oates argues that because manufacturers do not have to demonstrate efficacy for 
unapproved uses, research about novel uses is deficient.
303  He argues that under the current 
regulations, manufacturers have few incentives to undertake clinical trials to test the safety and 
efficacy of new uses for approved drugs that are already on the market.
304  And, even when 
manufacturers conduct trials, the trials do little to help the public because they are under no duty 
to disseminate the results.
305  Oates argues that market forces will likely be insufficient to 
motivate drug manufacturers to conduct the research necessary to test new uses of drugs.   
Therefore, he proposes a regulatory and legislative scheme modeled after the Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act (BPCA) in which the government mandates post-approval 
trials for off-label uses of some drugs.  In the BPCA, the government identifies potential off-
label uses of drugs and then provides funding for clinical trials to test those uses for children 
when the manufacturer refuses to do so.
306  In Oates’ plan, post-approval research would be 
required for all drugs that are regularly prescribed off-label.  The government would assist with 
funding for the clinical trials on a sliding scale based on the profits the company makes from the 
off-label use.
307  Oates also suggest that the FDA should participate in the analysis of the data to 
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make sure that the results are sound and the results of these studies must be made publicly 
available.
308  
Jaime Wilsker is also concerned with the lack of incentives for manufacturers to conduct 
post-approval research for unapproved uses of drugs.  In his Note, One-Half Phen in the 
Morning/One Fen Before Dinner, Wilsker contends that drugs dispensed in combination with 
each other should be treated like a new drug and should have to go through the FDA's NDA 
process.
309  He cites the phen-fen experience, in which at least 285,000 patients suffered heart 
valve damages, during the short period when the two drug combination was widely prescribed 
for weight loss,
310 to argue that two drugs, which used alone are harmless, may be deadly when 
prescribed in combination.
311  Because the FDA testing on safety will not reflect this danger, 
Wilsker argues that public safety requires the FDA to review new combinations of drugs the 
same way they would review new drugs that have yet to enter the market.
312   
Oates and Wilsker’s proposals would increase patient safety, but they would do so at the 
expense of getting new therapies into the hands of the patients who need them.  Both of these 
plans require substantial resources.  Unless Congress was to appropriate additional funds for 
these endeavors, they would require that the FDA divert financial and other resources from other 
initiatives to fund these initiatives.  Thus, while these both may be good ideas, they, like Week’s 
proposal, merely promote one value over another.  For example, Wilsker is correct that drugs 
prescribed in combination may present new dangers that the drugs alone would not.  He is also 
correct that the FDA’s current regulatory scheme allows this danger to persist.  However, his 
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suggestion that the FDA must review all drugs prescribed in concert as new drugs would likely 
cause significant delays in getting useful drugs to market and might cost as many lives for lack 
of treatment as it saves.  For example, many of the treatments for HIV and AIDS are cocktails of 
several drugs prescribed together.  Under Wilsker’s plan, these drugs would have to be approved 
as new drugs before being prescribed in concert.  In the time it takes drug makers to put together 
clinical trials and the FDA to review them, even under expedited review, thousands of patients 
could die or have their disease progress far more rapidly then it would have had they had access 
to the medications.   
Likewise, Oates’ plan requires providing drug manufacturers with supplementary funding 
to conduct post-approval research on new uses for drugs.  And it mandates that the FDA be 
involved in analyzing the data collected in these trials.  However, these innovations come at a 
cost.  FDA scientists who are currently involved in designing and overseeing clinical trials, will 
now be responsible for also overseeing these clinical trials as well.  Without significant new 
resources, this will simply slow down the approval of study design for new drugs and delay 
getting new drugs to market.   
VI.  A NEW PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE EDUCATION OVER 
PROMOTION 
 
There are shortcomings to the off-label marketing scheme originally created under the 
FDAMA and most recently suggested in the Draft Guidance: it allows manufacturers to 
disseminate information about off-label uses that endanger patients; it stifles innovation 
somewhat since manufacturers are not able to profit fully from new innovations; and it limits the 
number of patients who will be aware of and have access to treatments that could potentially 
benefit them.  However, these shortcomings all reflect the fact that the FDA is charged with the - 68 - 
promoting the competing interests of trying to get safe, effective, and reliable treatments to 
patients and doctors as quickly as possible and protecting the public from unsafe and ineffective 
drugs.  To this end the FDA has sought to strike a balance between promoting education of 
doctors and the dissemination of reliable information about new uses to patients while still 
protecting the public from widespread harm and trying to encourage drug manufacturers to 
submit SNDAs.   
What all of these proposals have in common is that they seek to recalibrate the balance 
either towards increased protection from harmful drugs or faster distribution of potential new 
treatments. However, the above examination of each of the proposals demonstrates that, like with 
any system trying to balance competing interests, strengthening one interest necessarily weakens 
the other.  Thus, all of these proposals seeking to change the over-arching regulatory balance 
attempt to plug one leak by removing the stopper from another.   One plan may help more 
patients to get more treatments but it will do so by allowing more patients to take dangerous 
drugs.  And another plan may prevent more patients from taking dangerous drugs, but it will do 
so by allowing those in need of treatments to suffer.   
With all of its present shortcomings, the current FDA scheme suggested under the 
Guidelines seems to best balance the competing interests between innovation and access to new 
treatments with protecting patients from under researched drugs.  It prohibits the widespread 
marketing of drugs that have not been tested for efficacy and safety while at the same time 
allowing manufacturers who are willing to undertake the clinical trials necessary to demonstrate 
safety and effectiveness to disseminate reliable research findings to doctors. It thus emphasizes 
education rather than promotion. - 69 - 
This distinction between education and promotion is an important one.  Promotion seeks 
to sell a product, it thus inherently wants to emphasize the benefits of the product while at least 
underemphasizing the risks.  Education on the other hand has no motive other than to 
disseminate unbiased information to those who need it.  We should be focused on promoting 
education rather than promotion.  However, most of the proposals for change put forth in the 
academic literature ignore this distinction between education and promotion. The academic 
literature seems to take as a given that drug manufacturer promotion is the only way to get 
information out to doctors and patients; thus, they simply accept that biased information is the 
only type of information that we can provide to doctors.  In proposing solutions then, academics 
focus on either reducing the review standards and regulations, which they see as barriers to 
promotion, or increasing these barriers for promotion.   
However, if the goal is to get patients and doctors reliable information about safe new 
treatments while still protecting them from experimental or under-researched drugs, the focus 
should be on promoting education while still restricting promotion.  This emphasizes making 
sure that the information that doctors receive is scientifically sound and unbiased.  By permitting 
drug companies to disseminate only full reprints of articles published in peer-reviewed reputable 
scientific and medical journals, the FDA regulations help to ensure that the information doctors 
receive about off-label uses is unbiased.  Moreover, by reviewing the materials before they go to 
doctors, the FDA can make sure that the studies and the results that they are publishing are 
scientifically sound.  In these ways, the FDA is on the right track towards promoting doctor 
education.   
However, the current regulations and guidelines significantly limit the number of doctors 
who get this information.  First, drug manufacturers must mail full articles to doctors who may or - 70 - 
may not have time to read them.  Second and more importantly, a doctor must receive the article 
from the drug manufacturer or hear of it from one of his peers in order to know it exists.  
According to the American Medical Association, there are nearly a million licensed doctors 
practicing in the United States today.
313  It would be incredibly expensive for pharmaceutical 
companies to determine which of the million practicing physicians treat patients with the 
conditions that their product treats.  Moreover, even if pharmaceutical companies could 
effectively target these doctors, for example finding a list of current oncologists in the United 
States, for pragmatic and economic reasons, drug companies can likely only reach a handful of 
these doctors through direct mailing of journal articles. Thus, huge numbers of doctors are left 
without the most cutting edge information to treat their patients.  Because of these limitations, 
pharmaceutical companies failed to disseminate information under Section 401 of the FDAMA. 
The Draft Guidelines does nothing to solve these problems.   
What we should be looking for then, are ways to get the FDA vetted information into the 
hands of doctors who need it.  A searchable database maintained by the FDA offers one means of 
doing this.  If a drug manufacturer submitted materials to the FDA that it wants to disseminate, 
the agency could enter the drug name, off-label indication, and cites to the articles and research 
supporting the indication into a database.
314  Then, doctors looking for a treatment for their 
patients could simply login to the database and search for drugs that may be beneficial for their 
patients.   
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Unlike some of the above-suggested solutions, this database would not be significantly 
costly to maintain. Under the FDAMA, the FDA reviewed and approved the materials that drug 
manufacturers wish to disseminate to doctors for off-label uses.  It also maintained records about 
what materials the drug companies are sending to which doctors.  So this system would add few 
additional costs as compared to the FDAMA.  This solution would also likely motivate 
pharmaceutical companies with drugs that have promising new indications to submit 
supplemental SNDAs because it would enable the type of targeted and effective marketing that 
could significantly impact sales.  In this case, rather than having to pay for blanket mailings to 
many doctors who will likely never read them, pharmaceutical companies would be able to reach 
all of the doctors who are looking for treatments that their drug targets.  In this way, this 
“marketing” would be more effective than even widespread promotion because pharmaceutical 
companies would be able to reach people who were serious about purchasing their product.   
Moreover, this solution would help to weed out those products that may be less effective 
or dangerous.  Because drug companies that send out materials under the dissemination 
provisions can only reach a limited number of doctors, they can only marginally increases sales 
over simply publishing a study in a medical journal.  It is therefore likely that even drug 
companies with promising drugs do not submit the SNDA to enable them to take advantage of 
the off-label dissemination provisions of the FDAMA.  However, since this database would 
reduce the cost of disseminating information for manufacturers while greatly increasing their 
access to doctors and patients looking for their treatment, it is likely that many more drug 
companies would want to take part.  Doctors might then presume that if a drug is not listed in the 
database it is because the drug manufacturer could not get a study published in a reputable - 72 - 
journal or did not want to submit to FDA review for some reason.  This would motivate drug 
companies with promising new uses to submit the SNDA to avoid this presumption.
315  
This database is only one way to promote doctor education within the current regulatory 
scheme while still protecting patients as well. Another example is that drug manufacturers who 
are eligible to distribute materials on off-label materials to doctors could have up to two or three-
off-label indications listed in the Physicians Desk Reference while they await their supplemental 
new drug approval.  Indeed this plan is not perfect.  By increasing the number of doctors who are 
aware of these off-label indications, we increase the risk of patient harm.  However, that occurs 
in any case where there is an increase in the number of patients taking any pharmaceutical 
product.  Moreover, by helping pharmaceutical companies reach doctors who are looking for 
their product, this system offers incentives for pharmaceutical companies to abide by FDA 
regulations, rather than attempt to circumvent it.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Since it began regulating human drugs, the FDA has tried to balance the interests of 
patient safety with making new therapies and medications accessible to patients as quickly as 
possible.  Responding to tragedies such as the Elixir Sulfanilamide fiasco, which killed over 100 
people in the 1930s, during the better part of the twentieth Century, the FDA tightened its 
regulations to increase patient safety.  And for several decades in the latter of half of the 
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twentieth century, the FDA maintained a complete prohibition of all off-label marketing of 
approved drugs.  However, as the rate of medical innovation sped up and the AIDS crisis created 
a need for rapid access to new therapies, the FDA has begun to shift the regulatory balance back 
in the other direction towards promoting research and drug access to patients in recent years.  
This was the purpose of the FDAMA’s new policy allowing for the limited dissemination of 
information of off-label drug indications, which sought to increase patient access to innovative 
uses of approved drugs while still protecting the public from exposure to novel and dangerous 
therapies.  
But, this policy and the regulations that the FDA promulgated under it drew significant 
criticism.  One group of critics argue that the policy does not do enough to promote research and 
keeps patients who need them from getting access to safe drugs.  The other group of critics 
argues that any promotion of off-label uses of drugs endangers the public by exposing them to 
under-researched drugs and treatments and reduces the incentives for drug companies to submit 
new uses to the FDA for approval.  Ultimately, because it was so burdensome and did not 
substantially increase drug manufacturer’s access to patients, few pharmaceutical companies 
took advantage of the provisions and they expired in 2006.  
Critics on both sides of the debate were correct.  The regulatory balance under the 
FDAMA restricted some patients from access to innovative treatments that could help them and 
endangered others by exposing them to drugs that have not been fully tested.  However, it was 
likely the best balance that the government can reach, which is reflected by the fact that the 
FDA’s Draft Guidelines seek to establish an almost identical system.  Moreover, by focusing on 
promotion by drug manufacturers rather than education, this debate is looking at the wrong - 74 - 
issues; rather than fighting about which interest is more important, safety or innovation, we 
should be trying to find a way to promote both interests at the same time.   
 Off-label treatments are some of the most cutting edge in medicine today and are the 
primary methods of treatments for diseases such as HIV and AIDS and cancer.  As long as we 
have a system where off-label prescribing remains as prevalent as it is today, we must find a way 
to get doctors the most accurate and unbiased information we can.  A database that provides 
physicians with unbiased scientific information about new indications for already approved 
drugs would provide doctors with invaluable information.  Moreover, being able to reach doctors 
looking for innovative treatments through such a database would cut the cost of information 
dissemination for pharmaceutical companies while increasing their incentives to submit SNDAs.  
By looking for solutions such as this which focus on fostering physician education rather than 
loosening restrictions on drug promotion manufacturers, the FDA can further the dual ends of 
promoting research and innovation while still protecting patients from under-researched and 
dangerous drugs.   